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The Florida Supreme Court has allowed new Standard Civil
Jury Instructions ("SCJI")' recommended by its Committee on Civil
Jury Instructions. 2 In allowing these new instructions, however, the
Court chose to not actually give its seal of approval to the Instructions
set out in 501.5. 3 Thematically, these SCJI deal with the tort law
concept of "Other Contributing Causes of Damages. '4
At their core, these Instructions deal with apportionment by a
jury, or not, of contributing fault causation once a tort has been
committed.5 For example, a tort resulting in injuries that may also
cause an aggravation of an antecedent condition; a tort involving
multiple events or causes coalescing to create one pool of damages; or
an initiating tort which then results in a completely separate,
subsequent negligence which creates greater harm beyond that first
injury. This latter situation is what this article will address.
A Larry M. Roth, B.S. Univ. of Tenn. 1973; J.D. Univ. of Fla. Law School 1975. Mr.
Roth is a partner in the Orlando office of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.
1. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases-Report No. 13-02, 135 So. 3d. 281
(Fla. 2014).
2. Comm. on Standard Jury Instructions (Civil), Report No. 13-02, at 3 (July 15,
2013). There was a dissenting view from certain committee members. Id. at 4-6. The vote
was 14-6, with 2 abstentions for the new Instructions. Id. at 4.
3. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 135 So. 3d at 282 ("In doing so, we offer no
opinion on the correctness of the instruction .....
4. Id. at 281.
5. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
The recently promulgated SCJI in 501.5 all deal with complex
matrices of variations in tort conditions and circumstances for which
civil juries are to apportion fault specifically attributable to the tort-
feasors responsible for each civil wrong.6 That is, parsing out each
tortfeasor's unreasonable actions, assigning degrees of responsibility,
and answering the question, "Who is responsible for each part, or for a
particular sum of the entire damages?"
The conceptual apportionment of fault in all these SCJI is fine.
The new Instructions track current tort principles in statutory enact-
ments and case law. However, the Supreme Court ignores a strong
public policy established by the State's elected body favoring some type
of apportionment of fault by allowing these new SCJI. The Instructions
in 501.5 improperly provide that if a jury cannot apportion out various,
separate causative actions, joint and several liability will apply by de-
fault.7 Meaning that any one defendant sued by a plaintiff can be made
to pay for everything!" The Court allowed release of these SCJI, which
are antithetical to legislation that had already abolished joint and sev-
eral liability. Statutory enactments to the opposite pole strongly
pronounce that public policy requires pure fault apportionment based
on separate responsibility and accountability, incontestably contra to
the draconian imposition of joint and several liability.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 282-83.
8. Id. at 282.
a. Aggravation or activation of disease or defect:
If you find that the (defendant(s)) caused a bodily injury, and that the injury re-
sulted in [an aggravation of an existing disease or physical defect] [or] [activation
of a latent disease or physical defect], you should attempt to decide what portion
of (claimant's) condition resulted from the [aggravation] [or] [activation]. If you
can make that determination, then you should award only those damages result-
ing from the [aggravation] [or] [activation]. However, if you cannot make that
determination, or if it cannot be said that the condition would have existed apart
from the injury, then you should award damages for the entire condition suffered
by (claimant).
b. Subsequent injuries/multiple events:
You have heard that (claimant) may have been injured in two events. If you de-
cide that (claimant) was injured by (defendant) and was later injured by another
event, then you should try to separate the damages caused by the two events and
award (claimant) money only for those damages caused by (defendant). However,
if you cannot separate some or all of the damages, you must award (claimant) any
damages that you cannot separate as if they were caused by (defendant).
In re Standard Jury Instructions, 135 So. 3d at 282.
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A full analysis of this throw back effect on non-apportionment of
fault, contra legem terrae,9 is beyond the scope of this article, but these
misdirected SCJI highlight a true poster child for an apparent anoma-
lous judicial conundrum: 501.5(c). Instruction 501.5(c) states:
c. Subsequent Injuries Caused by Medical Treatment:
If you find that (defendant(s)) caused [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] to
(claimant), the (defendant(s) [is/are] also responsible for any addi-
tional [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] caused by medical care or
treatment reasonably obtained by (claimant). 10
In 501.5(c), there is always joint and several liability.
This particular Instruction is fundamentally grounded in the
1977 case of Stuart v. Hertz Corp." By allowing 501.5(c) to be intro-
duced, the Court has reinvigorated a thirty-seven-year-old decision.
Reliance on Stuart most accurately illustrates the Court's apparent
partial abandonment of pure apportionment of fault in tort actions. By
this new Instruction, the Supreme Court also abandoned it long-stand-
ing common law ruling in Fabre v. Marin 2 and its progeny.' 3 Further,
in contradistinction to 501.5(c) are several public policy codifications by
the Legislature ending, most recently, in Fla. Stat. § 768.81(b)(3),"4
which set forth, once and for all, the end of any tort liability but-for
apportionment of fault.
I. STUART V. HERTZ CORP.: A WRECK OF A DECISION
Stuart was decided in 1977, when Jimmy Carter was President.
It was a simple tort case. The central holding in Stuart was that an
initial tortfeasor would be liable for any subsequent medical malprac-
tice that may have aggravated injuries/damages occurring after the
precipitating tort, yet not directly caused by that tort violator.' 5
9. "Against the law of the land." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (8th ed. 2004).
10. See In re Standard Jury Instructions, 135 So. 3d at 283.
11. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977). The Supreme Court has been asked numerous times
over the years whether Stuart is still good law. They have refused to answer. See Nason v.
Shafranski, 33 So. 3d 117, 121 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Letzker v. Cephas, 792 So.
2d 481, 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Letzker, 792 So. 2d at 488-89 (Klein, J., dissent-
ing) ("Stuart abrogated by the Act [ch. 768]").
12. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
13. See, e.g., Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Serv., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla.
1996) ("We agree and now hold that in order to include a nonparty on the verdict form
pursuant to Fabre, the defendant must plead as an affirmative defense the negligence of the
nonparty and specifically identify the nonparty."); Wells v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med.
Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1995).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2)-(3) (2011).
15. 351 So. 2d at 705-07.
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In Stuart, the injured party was sent to the hospital after an
accident. 16 While in the hospital, a doctor committed medical malprac-
tice on plaintiff-patient, resulting in the initial harm being made much
more serious. 17 The initial tortfeasor, Hertz, thinking they were not
responsible or liable for the treatment administered by the doctor,
brought a third party action for indemnification on this extra harm
caused by the doctor's post-temporal negligence.' The subsequent
malpractice aggravated an injury that was otherwise not there when
the dust settled from the original tort episode.' 9 Hertz wanted indem-
nification for those subsequent injuries they arguably did not cause-
those which were the result of a physician's errant scalpel. 20 Florida's
Supreme Court enunciated that the original tortfeasor could not bring
a third party action for indemnification against those doctors to lessen
their exposure to damages and stated, "We hold that such an action for
indemnification may not be brought. To hold otherwise would alter
traditional indemnity law by adopting a doctrine of partial equitable
indemnification between active tortfeasors ."21
Long before what current Justice Fred Lewis sardonically re-
ferred to as the so-called "alleged medical malpractice crisis,"22 Stuart
shackled an original tortfeasor with the weight of all damages flowing
from that initial tort, even those created by unrelated, subsequent-in-
time medical malpractice. 23 This legal pronouncement immunized
healthcare providers from being accountable for their medical negli-
gence on a plaintiff, contrary to present day standards and Florida's
public policy, which has evolved since Stuart's 1977 holding.24
The formal reincarnation of Stuart via 501.5(c) consequentially
permits the comprehensive medical malpractice statutory scheme to be
bypassed. 25 Stuart established absolute liability on that initial
tortfeasor for subsequent medical negligence, no matter what it was or
16. Id. at 704.
17. Id. The initial auto accident injuries were orthopaedic. Id. At the hospital, the doc-
tor severed plaintiffs carotid artery during surgery "causing a neurological disability." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 706-07.
21. Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 705.
22. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 905 (Fla. 2014).
23. 351 So. 2d at 707. This, in effect, kept medical malpractice cases from being filed.
24. The Medical Malpractice and Related Matters Statute, oft amended, can be found
at FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101-766.316 (2012).
25. Cf., Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 707-08 (Boyd, J., dissenting). This is exactly what Justice
Boyd implied in his Stuart dissent. In this type of situation, plaintiff should be suing di-
rectly for medical malpractice.
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when it occurred. 26 If a tortfeasor put someone in the hospital because
of original negligence, all subsequent harms would be imputed onto the
original tortfeasor 7 In a confounding legal non-sequitur proffered to
support its holding, the Stuart panel essentially said that after a
tortfeasor injures someone, thereby sending them for obviously-neces-
sary medical attention, it naturally follows that doctors or hospitals
can be expected to commit medical malpractice resultant in more seri-
ous injuries.2 For this mishandled medical handiwork, that original
tortfeasor is liable. Stuart infected the initiating tortfeasor with paying
the cost of a presumed foreseeable, defined as reasonably anticipated,
healthcare provider's botched treatment.29 Stated as a corollary, a first
come tortfeasor would buy, in less legal parlance, the entire "farm" of
damages even if that negligent person had no direct involvement with
the ensuing subsequent malpractice damages.
The jury in Stuart was precluded from separating out, or appor-
tioning fault, between Hertz's liability and that of a doctor's hands
doing damage to that particular plaintiffs previously healthy carotid
artery, an incident far removed from the initial car accident involving
non-incapacitating injuries.30 The plaintiff in Stuart was rendered
neurologically incapacitated by the medical care, an after-effect much
more serious than the original bodily intrusion. 31
The dissent in Stuart said there should be apportionment of the
damages between those occurring prior to the injuries incurred
through medical malpractice and those resulting therefrom.32 Instead,
the first tortfeasor, as well as the surgical instrument penetrating the
carotid artery, was judicially established to be the risk payment of de-
fendant Hertz for having the audacity to cause an accident in the first
place .33
One obvious problem was that Stuart, then or since through the
Supreme or other courts, never addressed at what point the interven-
ing, yet subsequent medical malpractice eventually reached the pivot
of being too far removed from the initial tort. This unaddressed issue
left initial tortfeasors wondering how much time needed to pass before
26. See generally id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 706-07.
29. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 764, 1526 (10th ed. 2014) ("The quality of being rea-
sonably anticipatable.").
30. Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 704.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 707 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
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they could stop worrying about subsequent injuries: six months, one
year, two years, or ad infinitum? There are cases following Stuart
where its principle is applied despite some form of medical negligence,
or a violation of community standards, occurring one or more years
post the initial common law tortious conduct.3 4
As a consequence of the holding in Stuart, first order negligence
became a joint tort with another who, at some later point in time,
caused totally separate injury to a person due to necessary medical
care necessitated by an accident. The original tortfeasor has to under-
stand that, due to Stuart, healthcare providers are going to butcher
their victim of original negligence. Thus, but for the negligence of an
individual or an insured setting into motion an unrelated chain of tort
events, all subsequent medical malpractice damages are bequeathed to
that original tortfeasor. The errant scalpel of Stuart did not sever this
linkage of causation.
11. ANY WAY TO ESCAPE STUART?
Unfortunately, Stuart seems to provide no relief to the original
tortfeasor from absolute joint and several liability.
One unstated rationale for Stuart is that an initial tortfeasor
defendant, having committed a common law tort, may actually help
keep medical malpractice insurance premiums lower by having to pay
for the negligence of the administering doctor, nurse, or hospital. In
Stuart, the implication was that the tortfeasor could separately sue the
doctors and other medical providers in a completely different proceed-
ing, maybe for contribution or indemnification.35 Little public policy, or
the practical consequences of the decision, were articulated in Stuart.
Nearly four decades later, the Florida Supreme Court has still not
given up their unstated stealth reasoning. The rationale may have
been that the tortfeasor Hertz, or its insurance company, had "deep
pockets" and could afford to pay for these subsequently enhanced mal-
34. See Pedro v. Baber, 83 So. 3d 912, 912-14 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (involving
treatment more than one year after initial accident).
35. See Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 706-07. There are a series of cases in which a defendant,
stung by Stuart, was made to bear all the damages and did pursue later causes of action
against the errant healthcare providers. See, e.g., Walker v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 842 So.
2d 804, 806, 814 (Fla. 2003) (holding that a medical malpractice action brought for contribu-
tion by a defendant who paid in the underlying suit was subject to the complex
requirements of Chapter 766, the medical malpractice statute); Walt Disney World Co. v.
Mem'l Hosp., 363 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that Disney's claim
for contribution was subject to medical malpractice mediation requirements).
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practice damages, which were as unrelated to that car accident or a
trip and fall, or whatever the original tort might be.
In the plaintiff-defendant personal injury or products liability
context, "deep pockets" is a pejorative term, at least to defendants. A
defendant's deep pocket that had been robbed by Stuart may some-
times swallow hard, like Walt Disney World, and actually bring a
separate lawsuit against those who commit medical malpractice to re-
capture their payment for subsequently made aggravated damages, as
Stuart presupposes. 36
The more likely scenario, due to litigation costs and unrecover-
able attorney's fees, is that the overpaying defendant would also have
to comply with complexities of the medical malpractice statutory re-
quirements and probably would not file that separate suit.3 7 This
would be a time-consuming, cumbersome, expensive, and precarious
lawsuit. Arguably, most Stuart zapped defendants will not go to such
extremes. Thus, the effect is that medically negligent culprits become
inoculated from having to pay for their mistakes.
Stuart also makes possible a potential windfall to plaintiffs, be-
cause a particular plaintiff did not have to independently sue for
medical malpractice. Stuart's holding provides an easy alternative to
avoid having to jump through legal hoops just to file a medical mal-
practice action.3 8
III. THE INTERVENING "LIVING YEARS"
For forty years the Florida Supreme Court has seemingly cho-
sen to ignore changing legal precepts, public policy, and the common
law after Stuart.3 9 With its 2014 re-affirmance of Stuart in 501.5(c),
the Florida Supreme Court, intentionally or not, approved a judicial
theorem long since abandoned. Yet, throughout this intervening time,
36. See Walt Disney World Co., 363 So. 2d at 600; see also Walker, 842 So. 2d at 806;
Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1980) (dis-
cussing an action for subrogation by tortfeasor against subsequent malpractice).
37. The complex requirements imbedded in Chapter 766 of the Medical Malpractice
Act apply to those situations where an underlying tortfeasor also pays for the subsequent
medical malpractice, and then turns around to sue those healthcare providers for contribu-
tion because of the tortfeasor's overpaid pro rata share. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text; see also Walker, 842 So. 2d at 809-10 (noting that a contribution action
is required to comply with complex requirements of Chapter 766 of the Medical Malpractice
Act).
38. See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101-766.316.
39. This refers to Fabre and changes to the apportionment of fault statutes which un-
equivocally now require apportionment of fault, even in subsequent enhancement of injuries
occurring in crashworthiness cases. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2011).
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the Supreme Court also began to embrace apportionment of fault prin-
ciples in contra to Stuart.
Prior to Stuart in 1977, the Supreme Court first birthed Flor-
ida's pure comparative negligence rule, instead of unforgiving
contributory negligence, in Hoffman v. Jones.40 Under the pure com-
parative negligence rule, a plaintiffs possible negligence did not
preclude him or her from tort recovery. 41 A plaintiff could now be
ninety-nine percent at fault themselves and still recover one percent of
jury found damages. The overarching and unstated rule was that, in a
fault based tort system, all parties were responsible for their pro-rata
harm caused on the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff was partially at
fault. 42 Pure comparative negligence would eventually essentially end
joint and several liability.
This comparative negligence theory was further established in
common law under Fabre v. Marin.43 Therein, a tortfeasor defendant
could, with evidentiary proof and identification, place both parties and
non-parties on a verdict form even if one of them had already settled
with a plaintiff.44 The jury would be given a specialized verdict form to
"apportion" fault for one ultimate set of damages, including plaintiffs
own degree of responsibility. 4  The trial judge would then assess attri-
bution for overall damages based upon those apportioned liability
percentages and enter judgment accordingly. 46 This holding embraces
the concept of judicial equity. If one committed no foul, then they paid,
in practice and theory, for no harm. Otherwise, everyone involved in
causing that foul would share in the manifested harm.
Successive statutory enactments used Fabre as the launching
pad to eradicate joint and several liability. Yet joint and several liabil-
ity, despite being now completely eviscerated by statute, somehow
40. Compare Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973) (adopting pure compar-
ative negligence in Florida), with Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886)
(contributory negligence barred any plaintiff recovery).
41. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 437.
42. Id.
43. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). See Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maint., Inc.,
986 So. 2d 620, 622 n.1 (Fla. 2007) (describing a Fabre defendant as a non-party "whom a
defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged.").
44. See Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186 n.3.
45. However, a judgment could not be entered against a Fabre defendant who was a
non-party. See Claudio v. Regalado, 116 So. 3d 451, 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). The
Fabre defendant was not a party to the suit, and thus not under the jurisdiction of the court,
so no judgment could be entered against him or her because of due process concerns. Id.
Fabre fault simply reduced the proportion at fault and damages to the actual defendants in
a lawsuit.
46. Id.
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survived through Stuart, and its SCJI permitted by the Supreme
Court. 47
IV. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: "LIVE AND LET DIE"
Historically, the concept of joint and several liability goes back
centuries. 4 Florida adopted the concept early in the twentieth cen-
tury,49 though it remains bewildering to even the most astute legal
minds.50 Joint and several means, literally and pragmatically, that one
deep pocket pays for everything. Between two tortfeasors whose ac-
tions cause a single harm, the one with the most money can be made to
pay for all the plaintiffs damages. For example, if both defendants B
and C are attributed fifty percent of the fault, C would then pay only
fifty percent of the apportioned damages. Plaintiff A could not squeeze
the full measure of their damages from either B or C, the latter which
illustrates joint and several liability. With joint and several, however,
plaintiff A can go after defendant C for one hundred percent of the
damages, even if C may only have contributed one percent of the total
harm. Theoretically, C would be able to sue the other tortfeasor. How-
ever, this is not practical in the real world, because C was likely
targeted as the party with the most money, whereas B might not have
any.
To the Florida Legislature, beholden to voters, all of this
seemed unfair. Even to a First Amendment secularized Florida Su-
preme Court, as conceptually recognized in Fabre, these types of
47. Since, under Stuart, the subsequent medical malpractice perpetrator was not a
joint tortfeasor, joint and several liability should not even apply. See Stuart, 351 So. 2d at
705 ("The parties causing injuries here were not joint tortfeasors but distinct and indepen-
dent tortfeasors"); Acadia Partners, L.P. v. Tompkins, 759 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct.
App. 2000) ("Joint and several liability among multiple tortfeasors exists when the
tortfeasors, acting in concert or through independent acts, produce a single injury") (empha-
sis added).
48. Joint and several liability is at least traceable to the late 1700s. See Hill v. Good-
child, 98 Eng. Reprints 465, 5 Burr. 2790 (K.B. 1771) (Mansfield, J.); see also William L.
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 418-19 & nn. 35-38 (1937).
49. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Allen, 65 So. 8, 11-13 (1914) (noting that joint and
several liability was judicially created); Stanley v. Powers, 166 So. 843 (Fla. 1936).
50. See, e.g., Stephanie Arma Kraft, Note, Modification of the Doctrine of Joint and
Several Liability: Who Bears the Risk?, 11 NovA L.J. 165 (1986), available at http://heinon
line.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/novalrll&div=20&id=&page=; Michael
S. Hooker & Guy P. McConnell, Joint & Several Liability in Florida: Are Reports of its
Demise Greatly Exaggerated?, 80 FLA. B.J. 11 (2006); Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515
So. 2d 198, 201-02 (Fla. 1987) (exemplifying the unfairness of joint and several liability as
Disney was found only one percent at fault, but paid for other defendants).
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results did not seem equitable either.5 1 Thus, public policy over the
years became an irreversible march toward completely abolishing joint
and several liability. But it was not a war easily won.
Historically, that first major skirmish ended with the Legisla-
ture, in 1986, only partially restricting joint and several liability from
non-economic damages in its first modern day tort reform effort.5 2
Then, in 1999, through Florida Statute Section 768.81(3), the Legisla-
ture adopted a modified joint and several liability matrix which
somewhat lessened the death grip the law had on anything contrary to
apportionment of fault. However, this was an extremely complex statu-
tory formulation having different percentages of fault activating a
modified joint and several liability sliding scale, but then only as to
economic damages.53 This form of joint and several liability applied
only to actual or compensatory damages,5 4 but did for sure abolish joint
and several liability as to non-economic or discretionary damages.55
Joint and several liability still clung to some kind of existence. How-
ever, this equation became very difficult to apply in actual trial cases.
In 2006, the Legislature finally abolished joint and several lia-
bility once and for all in favor of total pure apportionment of fault.5 6
Finally, in 2011, the Legislature reaffirmed that joint and several lia-
bility had not been brought back to life. 5 7 It was seriously dead and
buried.
V. STUART: AN ANACHRONISTIC ABERRATION OF THE LAW,
BUT A SOLUTION FOR IT?
The Florida Supreme Court's resurrection of Stuart v. Hertz
Corp. brings back joint and several liability, despite being expressly
51. See Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186-87.
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1986) (eliminating joint and several liability for economic dam-
ages, except when plaintiffs' fault exceeded defendant, or non-economic damages did not
exceed $25,000).
53. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3)-(6) (1999).
54. 'Actual damages", BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (10th ed. 2014) ("An amount
awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay
actual losses. - Also termed compensatory damages; tangible damages; real damages.").
E.g., past and future lost wages as well as past and future medical expenses.
55. "Discretionary damages", BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 472 (10th ed. 2014) ("Damages
(such as mental anguish or pain and suffering) that are not precisely measurable but are
determined by the subjective judgment of a jury"); "Non-economic damages", BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 473 (10th ed. 2014) (referencing non-pecuniary damages which are "[d] amages
that cannot be measured in money"). E.g., emotional distress, loss of capacity for enjoyment
of life, and pain and suffering.
56. FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2006).
57. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2011).
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contrary to Section 768.81(3) of the Florida statutes and years of public
policy. The other issue that SCJI 501.5 raises is that, in cases of a
subsequent, antecedent-tortfeasor combining to create a plaintiffs
damages when the prior or subsequent wrong cannot be apportioned,
either tortfeasor can then be held liable for 100% of the dam-
ages-except for Stuart, where the subsequent tort is medical
malpractice. As to this latter phenomenon, the original tortfeasor pays
all the damages because it is foreseeable that hurting someone will ne-
cessitate medical care. Medical malpractice is, then, this foreseeable
consequence of sending-through a non-intentional tort-an injured
person to the hospital, or off to seek some kind of medical attention.
What could possibly be the rationale of the Supreme Court, hav-
ing already applied apportionment of fault principles prior to 501.5(c),
unequivocally ignoring their own case law and legislation? This query
has nothing to do with indemnification because, due to Houdaille In-
dus., Inc. v. Edwards, the Court held joint tortfeasors could not turn
around and separately sue for indemnification for recovery on subse-
quent medical malpractice damages paid.58 This is due to the lack of
special relationship between a tortfeasor and the malpractitioner.5 9
Absent the special relationship, defendant is not technically, vicari-
ously, derivatively or constructively liable, according to Houdaille;
therefore, contribution may be the only option left.6 0
There should not be any Stuart standard instruction as
501.5(c). Instead, the best option is to simply give the jury a verdict
form that has a Fabre malpractice defendant or defendants listed on it.
The jury can then apportion out any subsequent medical malpractice
damages occurring after the original tort. After all, a defendant plead-
ing as an affirmative defense medical malpractice causing aggravation
or enhancement of damages is no different than having to apportion
out the same separation of damages for any non-medical Fabre defen-
dant. If there is medical malpractice, let the plaintiff directly sue the
healthcare providers instead. There are special statutory provisions for
such causes of action.6 1
58. 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
59. Id. at 493 (criticizing active-passive terminology).
60. Although, as former Justice Charles Wells has commented, "contribution" is really
no longer viable. Charles T. Wells & Allen Winsor, Apportionment from Hoffman v. Jones
Through the 2011 Legislative Session: Perfecting the Equation of Liability with Fault, 34
TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 29 (2012).
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2008) (regarding pre-suit screening) and § 766.203
(2004) ("Presuit Investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses by prospective
parties.").
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If subsequent medical malpractice is committed after a sepa-
rate, distinct tort why should Wal-Mart, Publix, Disney, Busch
Gardens, or even the average negligent driver in an intersectional colli-
sion have to pay for these later medical malpractice damages?
Subsequent malpractice tortfeasors are not joint tortfeasors anyway.6 2
Therefore, not being joint tortfeasors means there cannot be, as a mat-
ter of law, joint and several liability.6 3 The Stuart instruction
abrogates the entire medical malpractice statutory scheme. This is be-
cause, in a regular tort case, the plaintiff has only to prove simple
negligence, a much less onerous burden of proof than is required for a
medical malpractice case,64 and in the former, there is no damages
cap. 65
The Stuart subsequent negligent healthcare provider essen-
tially escapes unpunished despite his or her breach of duty and
violation of community standards of reasonable care, which proxi-
mately causes these identifiable separate injuries. Yet Stuart, for its
rationale, quotes the following from a 1932 case:
Where one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of the neg-
ligence of another exercises reasonable care in securing the services
of a competent physician or surgeon, and in following his advice and
instructions, and his injuries are thereafter aggravated or in-
creased by the negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of such physician
or surgeon, the law regards the negligence of the wrongdoer in
causing the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages
flowing from the subsequent negligent or unskillful treatment
thereof, and holds him liable therefor. 66
Thus, Stuart relies on now discarded indemnity concepts of "active and
passive tortfeasors. ' '67 Stuart and the new 501.5(c) SCJI based upon it
derive much of their reasoning from that 1932 case, J. Ray Arnold
Corp. v. Richardson .6  Some have criticized Stuart's use of Richard-
62. See Beth Bates Holliday, J.D., Common-Law Principles Regarding Joint and Sev-
eral Liability - In General, in 32A FLA. JUR. 2D JOINT AND SEVERAL TORTFEASORS § 1 (2015)
("Joint tortfeasors are defined as those who act together in committing a wrong, or acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.") (emphasis added).
63. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (2011).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 766.102.
65. Contra McCall, 134 So. 3d at 916 (overruling on constitutional grounds some of the
medical malpractice damages caps).
66. See Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 707 (quoting J. Ray Arnold Corp. v. Richardson, 141 So.
133, 135 (Fla. 1932)).
67. Houdaille, 374 So. 2d at 493.
68. Richardson, 141 So. at 135.
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son's elocution as being taken out of context.6 9 Paradoxically,
Richardson helped Stuart conclude the original tortfeasor is not a joint
or concurrent tortfeasor with creators of the subsequent medical mal-
practice injuries. Yet, Stuart still imposes joint and several liability
where joint tortfeasors now does not exist. This Black Letter Law error
should have killed off the case long ago.
As such, the Supreme Court in SCJI 501.5(c) relies on a fatally
archaic legal concept to resuscitate joint and several liability despite
the latter being legislatively abolished. Stuart is certainly not a deci-
sional paragon of stare decisis which should be surviving today.
Although not directly the purpose of this Article, Stuart also
creates a vacuum in causation law by creating absolute liability favor-
ing plaintiffs' and non-necessity to prove medical care and
reasonableness of medical expenses in personal injury cases.7 0 This is-
sue involving Stuart was also bantered about at the Committee level. 71
Stuart has caused numerous headaches for defense lawyers, prevent-
ing them from challenging either the necessity of the medical
treatment in their attempt to break the causative liability chain or try-
ing to preclude tortfeasor one from paying either some or all medical
expenses.7 2 In order to apportion liability and damages once Fabre v.
Marin came along, appellate courts still blocked any Stuart out-
flanking maneuver when a defendant directly challenged the
subsequent malpractice.7 3 Stuart even prohibits a direct challenge
solely to the reasonableness of Plaintiffs medical bills as damages
flowing from Defendant's initial harm.74 The effect, in essence, is that
each time a defense lawyer raises these points, it is determined to be
only a camouflage effort of subterfuge to eliminate damages caused by
medical malpractice, and not to the original tort.7 5
69. See Curtright C. Truitt & Michael P. Vernik, Stuart v. Hertz: What Have We Done?,
33 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 16, 17 (2014).
70. 351 So. 2d at 707-08.
71. See In re Standard Jury Instructions, 135 So. 3d at 281-82.
72. See Stuart, 351 So. 2d at 707.
73. See, e.g., Dungan v. Ford, 632 So. 2d 159, 163-64 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(reversing a verdict for the defendant where the court found the trial judge allowed the
defendant to try a malpractice claim in the main action).
74. See Pedro, 83 So. 3d at 914, 916 (noting that while the term malpractice was
avoided, a Stuart instruction was necessary because expert testimony, paired with closing
arguments, called into question the care provided by a subsequent tortfeasor medical
provider).
75. See Tucker v. Korpita, 77 So. 3d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that, since questioning went beyond just advisability of treatment, a Stuart instruction was
required).
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In 2001, a different group of Supreme Court Justices drove Stu-
art all the way into the infield of discussing motor vehicle
crashworthiness law.7 6 That Court, a generation removed from Stuart,
used it to analogize the ephemeral second collision enhanced damages
in a motor vehicle crash not caused by the initial accident as being
nothing more than a subsequent tort-such as sending a tortfeasor's
victim to the hospital where aggravated or enhanced (the latter a
crashworthiness maxim) injuries are precipitated by the healthcare
system through malpractice. Just like in a crashworthiness case, the
subsequent medical negligence does not create joint tortfeasors.77
That, as to crashworthiness, is a far cry, from a timeline standpoint,
from sending someone to the hospital or doctor subsequent to some first
tort, like a slip and fall, where days or weeks later the subsequent
chain of initial liability continues to flow causatively when the medical
malpractice eventually occurs. Crashworthiness-enhanced injuries in a
car crash, as an inapposite postulate, happen faster than the blink of
an eye.78 It has taken a decade for legislation to conclusively overrule
the Supreme Court's paradigm of crashworthiness liability and impose
only pure apportionment of fault principles to second collision or en-
hanced injury cases.7 9
CONCLUSION: OH THE SORDID MESS!
Looking back on its four decades of viability, Stuart has
wreaked continuing havoc on its "long and winding road." To a non-
medical malpractice attorney, such as this author, Stuart immediately
materializes as insulating plaintiffs' attorneys from having to prove a
more difficult legal wrong, i.e., medical malpractice. The Florida Su-
preme Court decision in Stuart essentially involves a party who seeks
medical care for bodily harm, after injury by a tortfeasor, and is subse-
quently injured, collecting entirely from the first perpetrator, and thus
creates the working assumption that healthcare providers should be
expected to commit malpractice on that patient! Does that not give an
implied license for the doctor to be careless and unaccountable?
Beyond this, however, Stuart is being criticized for reviving
joint and several liability, which, unquestionably, is no longer in exis-
tence in Florida. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court continues to
76. See D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 435-36 (Fla. 2001).
77. Id.
78. See Larry M. Roth, Florida's Motor Vehicle Crashworthiness Enhance Injury Doc-
trine: Wanted Dead or...", 18 BARRY L. REV. 389, 415-19 (2013).
79. See FLA. STAT § 768.81(3) (2011).
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perpetuate a reversal of Legislative enactments with SCJI 501.5(a)
and (b), "Other Constitution Cases of Damages." These Instructions all
have the same ultimate flaw. If a jury cannot apportion out aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing condition or, as noted, subsequent or "multiple
events," then one defendant and one defendant alone must shoulder
the entire panoply of damages; ergo, joint and several liability. SCJI
501.5(c), based on Stuart, does not even allow a jury to attempt to dis-
sect or attribute other damages.
But what is a Stuart type of defendant to do? He or she may no
longer have a right to contribution under Florida law for a separate
recoverable lawsuit, 0 and indemnification is not appropriate, either,
in a separate action. Instead, a Stuart type defendant is left with the
harsh inequities of joint and several liability. Apportionment, on the
other hand, is not an exact science-it is more like the bubble gum and
rubber band ingenuity which brought home Apollo 13 from disaster. It
is a give and take, a bundle of compromises. Perhaps the jury simply
liked one lawyer better than the other? The key is that the jury is oth-
erwise free, based upon the evidence, to apportion fault as they choose.
How else can one otherwise explain some of the pro-rata percentages of
fault at which juries arrive, i.e., seventy percent to one party, four and
a half percent to another, zero percent to plaintiff?," Whether the Su-
preme Court likes it or not, apportionment of fault happens now in
every applicable tort case. Why should Stuart be any different?
When expert opinions, closing arguments, and just plain com-
mon sense of the jury cannot aid in attributing percentages to all
possible parties, then the trial judge, after at least one Allen charge, 2
should simply declare a mistrial. Even for a Stuart type situation, this
will not happen any more often than it does in any other tort cases
involving apportionment. The contaminated run-off from Stuart must
be blocked. The Supreme Court has thus far refused to do so; despite
certification to the Court several times, Stuart v. Hertz Corp. is still
good law in light of the 1986 Tort Reform, subsequent legislative enact-
ments of 1999 and 2006, and the evolving case law on fault based
apportionment.8 3
80. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3)-(6) (1999).
81. Healthcare Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 86 So. 3d 519, 520 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2012).
82. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Schneider v. State, 152 So. 2d 731
(Fla. 1963); SCJI 801.3 (referring to procedures for when a jury is deadlocked).
83. Nason, 33 So. 3d at 121 n.1; Caccavella v. Silerman, 814 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002); Letzker, 792 So. 2d at 488 (holding that Stuart is at odds with Chapter 768,
but not answering whether Stuart is still viable); Letzker, 792 So. 2d at 488-89 (Klein, J.,
dissenting) ("Stuart [has been] abrogated by [Chapter 768]").
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So the Legislature, again, must step in, as that is how judicially
created joint and several liability was eliminated. Section 768.81 can
be amended to include specific application of Stuart's subsequent medi-
cal malpractice in a regular tortfeasor situation for apportionment of
fault. As noted, Stuart involves no joint tort resulting in a single in-
jury.8 4 The legislation can specifically call out Stuart to state that a
subsequent medical malpractice perpetrator can, as a non-party, be on
the verdict form for apportionment of fault under section 768.31, like
in Fabr6. This is similar to the 2011 legislation, in which the legislative
branch broke the misapplication of crashworthiness law to permit ap-
portionment of fault.8 5
Additionally, the medical malpractice statute 6 should commen-
surately be amended to exclude an already cumbersome recoupment
action by a non-joint tortfeasor who bears the Stuart yoke of subse-
quent medical malpractice, and to provide restrictions to avoid double
recovery by the plaintiff. Chapter 766 can be further amended, if Stu-
art remains viable, so that a plaintiff can file a notice with the circuit
court that would toll the limitations period until the underlying tort
action is completed. Then, if necessary, the plaintiff has the time to sue
the medical malpracticioners too, with provisions for set-offs of any
sums recovered because of Stuart.
Of course, all this assumes the Supreme Court will not, finally,
dump the Stuart case. Such recourse would be the easiest solution.
Although none of these others are bullet proof suggestions, they are a
start, and at best, the anachronism of Stuart will be reconfigured.
There is no overpowering argument that a Stuart situation cannot be
handled by a Fabre apportionment of fault evidentiary determination.
One would have to think a jury, like in Stuart, does not have the
wherewithal to apportion a number to the fault of a negligently sev-
ered carotid artery. To believe differently would be an affront to the
jury system. Whereas, on one hand, trial judges laud juries for their
sacrifices and community service, the Supreme Court must think them
imbecilic to not be able to layer through fault to tally up the bottom
line to 100%, even inclusive of the subsequent medical malpractice.
If any of this is ignored, it is an irresponsible cop-out for the
reincarnation of joint and several liability. If the legal system cannot
84. See D'Amrio, 806 So. 2d at 435-36. The Supreme Court has specifically stated Stu-
art, with its subsequent medical malpractice, does not create joint tortfeasors. Thus, if
parties are not joint tortfeasors, there cannot be joint and several liability. See FLA. STAT.
§ 768.81(3).
85. See Roth, supra note 78, at 421-25.
86. FLA. STAT. § 766.
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do better than, say, at least the 1700's in terms of a legal doctrine, then
maybe we have a lot more to worry about legally and politically than
what percentages to apportion to negligent or liable parties in a
lawsuit.
There is that one further disconnect with 501.5(c). The Supreme
Court does not endorse 501.5. Their Opinion permits these Instruc-
tions by saying that the instructions are not the Court's, nor does the
Court endorse them. 7 The result is a new Standard Civil Instruction
on "complex" issues of the law,"" which the Supreme Court treats as a
pariah, giving them no legitimacy.
This may be a nice judicial nuance, as experienced trial lawyers
know a trial judge is always going to give the Standard Instruction, as
the presumption is that they come with the "Good Housekeeping" seal
of the Supreme Court. They are a safe, non-reversible bet, and this will
be no different for these newly promulgated edicts of the Law in 501.5.
Certainly, in all due respect, it is anathema for the Supreme
Court to disown these Instructions. If they are wrong or inadequate,
the Court should reject them, sending them back to Committee like
they did a few years ago on the "crashworthiness" proposed Instruc-
tions.8 9 To give these new Instructions the appearance of approval is
wrong. As a consequence, at least to the Author, since at least one of
these new Instructions-501.5(c)-is absolutely incongruent, they will
and should be challenged.
87. See In re Standard Jury Instructions, 135 So. 3d at 281.
88. Id. ("There is no need for a specific instruction for this complex legal subject.").
89. The Court rejected most of the Committee's product liability proposed instructions,
including those on crashworthiness. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases - Re-
port. 09-10, 91 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2012).
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